distinction between the logical structure and the social role of law, and he argued in 'First Lines' that 'it is the Civil Code that applies more immediately to the common end in viewviz. the greatest happiness of the greatest number: with relation to the Civil Code, taking the mass of its arrangements for an intermediate end, the matter of the penal code is but a means'. 14 The reason for this statement may be that the expectation utility generated from the definition of social relation in the Civil Code is much more important than the original utility which is concerned with the Criminal Code. H. L.A. Hart's famous criticism of John Austin for overemphasizing the criminal aspect of law does not apply to Bentham.
As argued above, the purpose of Bentham's Pannomion was to secure people's legitimate expectations. Bentham's ultimate purpose was 'every man his own lawyer' and we can see his device for it in Legislator of the World. Firstly, as the maximization of the notoriety of law is
Although it is a familiar one, this may be the right place to assess John Rawls's criticism of Bentham, because the assessment can help to make the nature of Bentham's Pannomion clearer. As is well known, Rawls claimed that Bentham's theory is incompatible with liberal values as it can undermine minority rights. But, as Rosen points out, we have to see Bentham's theory not as a top-down theory but as a bottom-up theory in which not the principle of utility but the secondary principles derived from the principle of utility are applied to practice.
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Among these secondary principles are the security-providing principle and the disappointmentpreventing principle. The security-providing principle gives everyone rights of person,
property, condition and reputation, which are not usually subject to a utility calculation. The greatest happiness of the greatest number cannot be achieved, Bentham thought, if we directly invoke the principle of utility and upset people's expectations. And as Paul Kelly suggests, these rights sanctioned by the provisions of the Pannomion could do the same jobs as Rawls's social primary goods by making the pursuit of diverse goods possible. 20 15 Cf. ibid., pp. 8-10. 16 Cf.ibid.,p. 138. 17 Ibid., p. 260. 18 Cf. ibid., p. 249. 19 Cf. F. Rosen, 'Utilitarianism and the Punishment of Innocent: The Origins of a False Doctrine', Utilitas, ix (1997). 20 Cf. P. Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, Oxford, 1990, p. 87.
The legislator of the world
It is a remarkable fact that Bentham's Pannomion was thought to be usable in any country if some adjustments were made according to the circumstances of that country. Bentham argued that 'in comparison of the universally-applying, the extent of the exclusively applying circumstances will be found inconsiderable' and actually proposed to many countries that they should adopt his codes. 21 As I said in the introduction, this endeavour of Bentham's is not well known and Bentham studies have not paid much attention to it. But William Twining points out that Bentham's 'universal jurisprudence' is one of the five pillars of his jurisprudence (others being utility, the theory of fiction, legal positivism and the command theory, and democratic theory and constitutional law). 22 And if we regard Bentham as a 'theorist of globalization', which I will do, it is useful to summarize Bentham's aspect of 'legislator of the world'. In the introduction of 'Time and Place', Bentham refers to the methodology of the work:
First, the laws which it is supposed would be the best for England, must be exhibited in terminis: next, the leading principles upon which the differences between those and the laws for Bengal appear to turn, must be displayed: lastly, those principles must be applied to practice, by travelling methodically over the several laws which would require to be altered from what they are in the one case, in order to accommodate them to the other.
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The second and the third points are considered by Therefore, in the catalogue of circumstances influencing sensibility, 'we shall find the sum total of the principles of which we are in search: the principles which, in our inquiry concerning the influence of place and time on matters of legislation, are to serve as a guide'.
34
In other words, for instance, where people experience huge pain from crimes which offend religious sensibility, the punishment must be made heavier accordingly. So the legislator should be provided with two tables to do the work required. 'Those of the first set would exhibit a number of particulars relative to the body of laws which has been pitched upon for a standard, as contemplated in different points of view'. 35 And 'Those of the other set will be: a general transplantation of law. And of these, the following rules are important.
That 'the clear utility of the law will be as its abstract utility, deduction made of the dissatisfaction and other inconvenience occasioned by it' 46 is the fifth rule, which is complemented by the sixth rule, 'the value of dissatisfaction will be in the compound ratio of three things: 1 .The multitude of the persons dissatisfied; 2.The intensity of the dissatisfaction in each person; 3.The duration of the dissatisfaction on the part of each'.
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Here we should consider the concept of intensity in Bentham's theory. As we saw above,
intensity cannot be measured precisely because of its subjective character. So how did
Bentham try to measure the intensity of dissatisfaction in the above sixth rule? The answer is, through discussion. According to Tom Warke, public choice in Bentham's theory had a twostep utilitarian process:
First, proponents of any action must specify, thus opening to debate, the types of pleasure and pain that they believe will ensue. ... Second, they must specify, again opening to debate, what relative weights on these types of pleasure and pain have led them to their conclusion that the act would add to the aggregate happiness of sentient beings.
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In a word, Bentham thought that the intensity of people's pleasure and pain can be understood only through open discussion.
We should also note that Bentham here refers to dissatisfactions occasioned by new laws.
What matters here is his disappointment-preventing principle to which I have referred in section 2.1. 49 Bentham emphasized the importance of utility arising from expectation, and thought that if a legislator tries to reform and change the subsisting institutions, there may rise disutilities derived from the disappointed expectations. The disappointment-preventing principle was supposed to solve this problem by compensating those who lost through reforms.
The seventh rule was that 'as a means of obviating dissatisfaction, indirect legislation should be preferred to direct; gentle means, to violent: example, instruction, and exhortation should precede or follow, or, if possible, stand in the place of law'. The general result of these rules is, that the legislator, in producing great changes, ought to be calm, collected, and temperate in well doing ...
indemnifying those that lose, and making an alliance, so to speak, with time.
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That calculations of utilities are required at the transplanting of laws, that indirect legislation which does not give rise to antipathies is preferred and that disappointment caused by the reform must be compensated through the disappointment-preventing principle are the main points of
Bentham's argument. And for our purpose, it is important to note that Bentham thought that calculation of utility should be done directly through open discussion.
Freedom of the press and of public discussion has a critical role in Bentham's theory.
As we have just seen, Bentham thought that what makes people happy should be decided by calculating the intensities of pleasure and pain felt by them. Here lies the importance of public discussion, which was a means to determine the intensity of experience, and freedom of the press, which provided materials for the discussion. Of course, these devices were also important for despotic countries. Bentham thought that a people restricted by a heap of idle, trifling, and ridiculous obligations and restraints were by no means happy and argued that the mere whim of a despot could not decide the utility of an institution. 52 He seems to argue that even despots should consult people's intensity of response to their proposals through a free press and free public discussion in order to carry out policies which lead to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In section 3, I will examine Bentham's attitude toward despots through his work 'Securities Against Misrule', which is, I think, attempting to address the problems caused by cultural pluralism.
Bentham's 'Securities Against Misrule'

Bentham on tyranny
Bentham's attitude toward despots is developed in one of the volumes in the his Pannomion for that country and was eager to pursue this opportunity.
The region, referred to as barbarian at this time, was unstable and poor. According to Bentham, the major problem was social and political instability. And the Pasha's arbitrary power and the absence of a rule of succession were the main reasons for that instability. not any part that is not included in the field of authority belonging to some Mosque'.
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Bentham tried to use these establishments to make his constitutional charter effective. We will see the details of Bentham's plan in what follows.
In the second section of 'Accounts of Tripoli', Bentham describes the chief of the state, the Pasha (Bashaw). After depicting the completely arbitrary nature of the Pasha's power and the problems arising from it, which for the purposes of this discussion I will refer to as social instability, Bentham says:
The succession is regarded hereditary in the present family. But the order of succession as between son and son is not regarded as settled. How general a gloom is cast over the whole country by this uncertainty may be imagined. The seating of the present Bashaw on the throne was the civil war between brother and brother: and upon his death, unless in the mean time some effectual remedy be applied, another civil war is regarded as inevitable.
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For the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to these wars of succession as political instability. The remedy for the social instability is the introduction of a constitutional charter;
and the remedy for the political instability is representative government. The details of these remedies are developed in 'Securities Against Misrule'.
As I wrote earlier in this section, 'Securities Against Misrule' is divided into 'Constitutional Securities of Tripolitan Nation' and 'Preliminary Examinations'. First, I
examine the rationale of the constitutional charter developed in 'Preliminary Examinations'.
In that work, Bentham examines the remedy for social instability arising from the Pasha's arbitrary power. First he divides the shapes of misrule as follows: National debilitation: weakening the means of defence and security in the hands of the people against injury at whatsoever other hands, those rulers themselves not expected. In this case the evil may be said to be mixt; or public through the medium of private.
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According to Bentham, the remedy for these misrules arising from the arbitrary power of Pasha is publicity:
So much for the disease. Now as to the remedy. A single word, publicity, has been employed for the designation of it. For this purpose another expression-Public
Opinion-might have been employed.
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Bentham argued that publicity is important for stopping misrule because:
the greater the number of the members of the whole community to whom the existence of an act of oppression has been made known, the greater is the number of those by whom, on the occasion of an endeavour to exercise other acts of a similar nature, supposing the past act notified to them, not only may obedience withholden, but resistance opposed.
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To make this function of publicity work, Bentham developed the concept of a public opinion tribunal, which we will see in the next section.
However, it is not clear why the Pasha should adopt the constitutional charter and give publicity to acts of misrule, which would certainly reduce his power. According to Bentham, the main problem in Tripoli was that:
Neither for life nor for liberty, for neither of those possessions, against resentment, fear, concupiscence or erroneous conception in the breast of Sovereign, can any permanent security be possessed by any one individual in the community in the present state of the government.
In respect of property all labour under insecurity, not merely in that shape in which it involves danger and alarm in respect of what they have already, but in that shape likewise in which by the sense of it they are prevented from making all those additions to it to which a feeling of security such as is enjoyed even in the worst-governed European nation is sufficient to give birth.
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Bentham also says:
The Pasha's revenue consists in the whole or in great part in a tax on the produce of the soil. Such produce can never receive any considerable encrease, but from a proportionate encrease in the quantity of labour and money laid out upon it in the shape of capital: and the quantity of capital can never receive any considerable encrease but from a correspondent change in the constitution.
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In a word, Bentham thought that the Pasha would profit from a constitutional charter because it would increase security and make the country more abundant. Thus, while in 'Time and Place', freedom of the press and of public discussion was a means of revealing the intensities of people's pleasures or pains, in 'Securities Against Misrule', publicity was for security.
As to political instability arising from the absence of a rule of succession, Bentham's remedy was the introduction of representative democracy. Bentham says that if the Pasha wants to avoid dispute about succession to the sovereignty among his sons and danger to the whole nation from a civil war produced by that dispute, he should have a meeting of persons chosen by the people to ratify his choice of successor beforehand. 63 We will see Bentham's concept of democracy in section 3.3.
Bentham's public opinion tribunal
In this section, I will examine Bentham's concept of the public opinion tribunal. As we saw above, Bentham argued that misrule could be prevented only through publicity, and the public opinion tribunal played the central part in it. In Bentham's own words, public opinion is 'the only source which is not included in the force of government: the only force therefore from which the force of government when operating in a sinister direction can experience any the least impediment to its course'.
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This public opinion tribunal is one of the key concepts of Bentham's theory. It plays a central part in his theory of international law as well. As this article mainly concerns
Bentham's idea of law and justice in a global society, it is important for us to understand this concept properly.
As to the constitution of the tribunal, Bentham says the following:
The persons considered as members of this tribunal are an indeterminate portion of the whole number of those of whom the community in question is composed. Those by whom actual cognizance is taken of the matter in question in the first instance may be considered as a Committee: those who in consequence of the opinions expressed by this same Committee, but without taking actual and particular cognizance of the circumstances of the case, join with them at different times in the same opinions, affections, wishes, designs and endeavours, constitute the body at large of which the smaller body abovementioned is the Committee. Of the Members of this larger body, the number may be of any magnitude not exceeding the sum total of the adequately adult members of the community.
65
And as to the function of public opinion tribunal, Bentham says it has mainly a statistic or evidence-furnishing function (delivering information and evidence of misrule), a censorial function (rendering judgments) and an executive function (punishing and rewarding). 66 And in these, the newspaper has a leading role:
In By the way, Bentham acknowledged the difficulty of using newspapers to deliver information on the constitutional charter and the transgression of it in Tripoli:
The power of public opinion being the only check that can be applied to the power of the arbitrary government, and the efficiency of that tutelary power depending as above upon the numbers of the persons to whom on each occasion the appropriate information is notified, the great misfortune is that in the country in question the means of notification are so narrow: in that country free Newspapers the matchless instruments of notification even
Newspapers of every kind being as yet altogether wanting.
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So Bentham tried to use the two universities, the 14 judicatories and the 3,000 mosques for the purpose of notification. He also tried to use the Cadi or Iman which he referred to in 'Account of Tripoli' for the purpose of punishment for violation of the constitutional charter.
Bentham on democracy and international law
In the previous two sections, we saw Bentham's argument regarding despots through an examination of his work 'Securities Against Misrule'. Bentham argued that even despots should adopt the public opinion tribunal. He argued that this scheme is good for despots as well because it would, he thought, lead to prosperity by introducing security.
However, Bentham later changed his position. In a word, he realized that it is illusionary to expect despots to adopt his scheme of reform. This point is concerned with Bentham's theory of democracy. The second turning point was from 1809 to 1810 when he 'fully' became a democrat.
After the failure of Scottish law reform and a meeting with James Mill, Bentham became a philosophical radical and began to argue that a full representative democracy was necessary to accomplish the greatest happiness of the greatest number in Britain. However, he didn't become a 'universal democrat' at this time either. He thought that democracy was good for
Britain, but also that forms of regime should be relevant to the time and place of countries.
This point is easily understood from his work 'Securities Against Misrule', which we saw above. There he proposed, at first, that despots should adopt his constitutional charter, which is compatible with an undemocratic regime.
For our purpose, the third turning point is the most important. When he wrote the article 'Economy as applied to Office' in 1822, he finally set out his position that only representative democracy can accomplish the greatest happiness of the greatest number. From then on, his proposal to draft the Pannom ion concentrated mainly on liberal countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Latin America.
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We have just seen Bentham's change of attitude toward democracy. As to the public opinion tribunal, it was firstly thought to be universal. But, in the end, here again, Bentham seems to give up his idea that a despot (like a Pasha of Tripoli) would adopt the public opinion tribunal. Bentham stopped thinking that he could convince the Pasha that a public opinion tribunal would be of benefit to him, and began to endorse a more controversial plan of military intervention. We will see this controversial plan in the conclusion. Before that, though, sovereignty. Here again, the public opinion tribunal plays an important role.
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According to Steven Conway, for Bentham: publicity was ... meant to be the weapon employed against recalcitrant governments. Once the soundly based decisions of court became widely known, governments that remained defiant would be exposed to a pressure that Bentham believed to be far more effective than military coercion. They would have to account for their actions to the Public Opinion Tribunal, composed of all the several individuals belonging to all the several states.
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For this purpose, Bentham argued that freedom of the press is necessary in every country.
The public opinion tribunal is important for international securities as well.
Conclusion
In this article, I have discussed Bentham as 'the legislator of the world'. In section 2, I examined Firstly, he thought that the principle guiding the transplantation of laws from one region to another was concerned with the circumstances influencing sensibility. In other words, he argued that legislators who transplant the law must consider the biases of sensibility, which
Bentham thought differed between communities. He then divided these into physical ones and moral ones, and argued that the latter can be changed. Because of the existence of expectation utility, Bentham thought that some regard must be paid to subsisting institutions. But he also argued that institutions at odds with the principle of utility, such as tyrannies or religious oppressions, must be reformed. As to Locke's attitude towards cultural diversity, Barbara Arneil's work, which considers the influence of Locke's theory on Amerindians, provides useful insights. In her book, John Locke and America, Arneil suggests that there are two fundamental aspects in Locke's argument regarding property. The first, she says, is Locke's belief that 'it is the natural right of labour which begins property. Discovery and occupation, having stood as the foundation of property in natural law for centuries, were no longer sufficient' so that 'aboriginal lands which were occupied but uncultivated could also be appropriated by Democracy, in the sense of rule of the majority, does not guarantee that human rights will be respected. But a democratic process requires that the policies of the government must be publicly defended and justified. They cannot simply be implemented from above. Although some of us may have the capacity to commit terrible crimes, many of us also have a moral sense, that is, a capacity to reflect on the rights and wrongs of what we are doing, or what our rulers are doing. That capacity emerges in the public arena. A small group may plot genocide, and inspire or terrify their followers to carry it out, but if genocide has to be defended on primetime television, it will become rare indeed.
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But then Singer faces 'the ultimate question of the relationship between democracy and sovereignty'. 83 Here, Singer asks himself 'how can we give reasons independent of our culture, for the view that legitimacy requires popular support, rather than resting on, say, religious law'. 84 Certainly from some standpoints of 'multiculturalism', illiberal or undemocratic societies, which do not respect the freedom of the press or of public discussion, On the other hand, Bentham's position that security is a universal value regardless of time and place has a more solid foundation. In Bentham's theory, security is 'maximized by limiting the possibilities of oppression either by one citizen over another or by the government over the citizen'. 88 And as we have seen, the former securities are established by the Pannom ion and the latter by the public opinion tribunal and democracy. Bentham was quite sound in arguing that although people are chasing various goods, everyone in the world wants security and security is a necessary value for everyone's life. And these are the reasons for Bentham trying to disperse his Pannomion and the public opinion tribunal, and later democracy, all argues, security is:
to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good.
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Singer's 'ultimate question of the relationship between democracy and sovereignty', which seems to be a cultural question, can be replaced by an empirical question whether freedom of the press, free public discussion and democracy lead to more security. As far as 'Time and Place' and 'Securities Against Misrule' are concerned, Bentham certainly thought that they do.
